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The efficiency of allocating physical capital and consumption goods
over time depends on the functioning of the financial system. Within
this market, banks play a fundamental role as financial intermediar-
ies, providing access to the payment system, transforming assets,
managing risk, and monitoring and processing information (Freixas
and Rochet, 1998).
In this paper we empirically study the role of banks in overcoming
the frictions that arise from asymmetric information. Specifically, we
study the effects on the volume of firm borrowing of the relationships
that firms and banks develop as a result of banks’ monitoring activi-
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about the quality of the client that is not shared by other intermediar-
ies, that is, banks and firms establish relationships. These relation-
ships reduce the extent to which moral hazard and adverse selection
problems affect the flow of credit to otherwise qualified borrowers.
Developing relationships allows the lender to better judge the quality
of a borrower, which reduces the extent of credit rationing and ben-
efits firms. The bank may be able to use this information to extract
rents, however, building an informational monopoly that may reduce
credit availability and distort the firms’ investment decisions.
We use a unique dataset to empirically investigate these specific
but crucial aspects of financial markets. We examine bank-client re-
lationships in a large sample of Chilean manufacturing firms during
the 1990–98 period. In particular, we investigate whether firm-bank
relationships—measured by the duration of lending ties—and actual
bank concentration faced by firms affect access to bank financing. On
the one hand, if the interaction between a bank and its clients miti-
gates informational asymmetries over time, then the availability of
credit should increase with the length of such relationships, condi-
tional on the creditworthiness of a firm. On the other hand, if a single
lender can exploit an informational monopoly, firms that rely on
multiple lending ties should have better access to bank loans. Deal-
ing with more than one bank involves transactions costs, however,
because monitoring efforts are duplicated and banks may free ride on
each other, reducing the level of screening effort. Debt renegotiation
also becomes increasingly complicated when the number of creditors
involved grows (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). Finally, credit market
competition reduces the ability of the firm and the creditor to
intertemporally share a surplus, as well as the extent to which the
bank can finance profitable projects when the firm’s cash flows are
low (Petersen and Rajan, 1995). Multiple banking relationships thus
are not necessarily beneficial for borrowers.
Since the consequences of concentration and relationship length
for access to bank lending are theoretically unclear, the empirical
assessment of these effects is especially valuable. Moreover, given
the particular characteristics of an emerging economy like Chile, this
assessment should ideally be done using country-specific data.
Most of the empirical literature on financial market imperfec-
tions focuses on the consequences on investment of internal funds
availability (in the line of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988) to
conclude that borrower-lender information asymmetries are a key
determinant of external funding access. A number of articles haveConcentration, Hold-up, and Information Revelation 213
studied the effects of lender-borrower relationships on firm perfor-
mance, such as on the value of the firm and investment decisions.
Relationships and the extent of the asymmetric information problem
have been measured in many ways. For instance, in studying the
sensitivity of investment to cash flow according to the degree of at-
tachment to banks, Hoshi, Kashyap and Stein (1991) associate be-
longing to a large industrial group as a proxy for weaker asymmetric
information. With this same purpose in mind, Schaller (1993) uses
the degree of ownership concentration as a measure of information
problems, Whited (1992) uses a dummy to capture whether a firm
has a bond rating, and Fohlin (1998) uses the number of the firm’s
board members who sit on a bank’s board of directors. Both Medina
and Valdés (1998) and Gallego and Loayza (2000) examine this same
issue for Chile, using alternative measures of information asymme-
tries. This paper takes one step back and studies the empirical plau-
sibility and importance of the asymmetric information problem on
bank lending. It also investigates the implications of competition and
concentration for bank lending at the microeconomic level.
The issues we examine in this paper are important in their own
right for the functioning of the financial market, particularly regard-
ing credit access of small and medium-sized firms, and they have
distinct implications for both market performance and policy. They
are also relevant for understanding monetary policy. For instance,
monopoly power arising from either information asymmetries or
straight lack of competition may modify an otherwise standard trans-
mission mechanism of monetary policy. Bank lending could further
amplify or dampen the effects of monetary policy through endogenous
changes in the external finance premium (the credit channel of mon-
etary policy).1
Our results indicate that lower concentration, measured by the
number of banks to which a firm is related, has a positive and eco-
nomically relevant impact on the volume of bank lending. After we
control for firms’ age, the length of borrower-lender relationships
has a positive effect on loans, although its significance is not robust
to alternative estimation methods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 quickly
revisits some theory and previous empirical work. Section 2 describes
the construction and main characteristics of the dataset. Section 3
1. See, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Kashyap and Stein
(1994).214 A. García, A. Repetto, S. Rodríguez, and R. Valdés
presents the main findings, evaluating the effects of bank concentra-
tion and the length of the lender-borrower relationship on borrowing
volume. Finally, section 4 presents the main conclusions and dis-
cusses a few policy implications.
1. THEORY AND PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
From a theoretical point of view, both bank concentration and
the length of lender-borrower relationships have ambiguous conse-
quences on access to bank loans. As for concentration, Diamond (1984)
develops a model in which bank financing is less expensive than bor-
rowing from public lenders, since intermediaries can save on moni-
toring and agency costs. Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) and Allen
(1990) give banks a special screening role. In either model, concen-
tration may further reduce costs or enhance efficiency under increas-
ing economies of scale. Márquez (2002) shows that increased
competition among banks may lead to information dispersion, increas-
ing the costs of borrowing. A market with few large banks, he con-
cludes, can have lower interest rates than a market with many small
banks. In the same venue, if too many banks serve one particular
client, incentives to properly monitor may weaken owing to the com-
mons problem, which, in turn, increases costs.
At the same time, while bank control can reduce costs and in-
crease efficiency, market power by banks may result in monopoly
pricing if competition or contestability (or both) are weak. Further-
more, a single bank may build up an ex post information monopoly
that adversely affects lending (Sharpe, 1990 and Rajan, 1992). This
hold-up problem can make it costly for a firm to switch lenders, as it
may signal that the bank with the information monopoly is unwilling
to lend to the firm. In this case, the bank can extract rents from the
firm and possibly distort its investment decisions. Concentration,
therefore, may produce a borrower capture. This problem is likely to
be more relevant if banks observe other banks’ lending, because the
stigma arising from denying or cutting financing is stronger than it
would be otherwise.
Competition may also affect the value of relationship lending,
modifying the amount banks are willing to invest in a relationship.
Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that greater inter-bank competition
reduces bank lending rents and decreases the importance of relation-
ship lending. Boot and Thakor (2000) extend Petersen and Rajan’sConcentration, Hold-up, and Information Revelation 215
model to allow for competition from the rest of the capital market
(for example, mutual funds and investment banks). They find that
increased inter-bank competition may increase relationship lending,
but then each loan has lower value-added for borrowers. Further-
more, they find that higher competition from the capital market re-
duces total bank lending as well as relationship lending, although
each relationship loan has higher value-added for borrowers.
As for lender-borrower relationships, it is straightforward to ar-
gue that a lengthier relationship produces a more durable connection
that alleviates information asymmetries, thereby reducing financial
costs.2 Long relationships, however, can potentially be costly for a
borrower, if the stigma of cutting financing is higher the longer—and
thus the more informed—is the relationship.
A number of empirical studies address the effects of concentra-
tion and relationships. Regarding concentration, Houston and James
(1996) undertake an analysis based on detailed information on the
debt structure of American publicly traded corporations; they find
that firms that borrow from a single bank, as opposed to firms that
borrow from multiple banks, depend less on bank loans to finance
their operations when growth opportunities are important. This evi-
dence is consistent with the notion that information monopolies al-
low banks to extract rents from borrowers. They also find that banks
specialize in lending to smaller, less risky firms (relative to the typi-
cal firm in their sample).
Cetorelli (2001) reviews both the theory and the evidence of the
effects of competition on the banking industry and concludes that the
common wisdom that restraining competition always reduces wel-
fare is not necessarily correct. For instance, using a panel of thirty-
six industrial sectors for a group of forty-one countries, Cetorelli and
Gambera (2001) find that bank concentration does impose a dead-
weight loss on the credit market as a whole, resulting in a reduction
of credit supply. However, the effect is heterogeneous across indus-
trial sectors: industries that depended heavily on banks for invest-
ment and growth benefit from concentration, presumably because
they develop closer relationships. Using the ratio of banks’ small busi-
ness loans to total assets, Berger, Goldberg and White (2001) study
the effects of banking entry and of bank mergers and acquisitions
(M&As) on the supply of small business credit by other banks. They
2. Of course, a lengthier relationship is not the same as firm age, which is
probably negatively correlated with information asymmetries.216 A. García, A. Repetto, S. Rodríguez, and R. Valdés
find that there are modest aggregate external effects of both M&As
and new entries, and that these effects depend on bank size. Using a
panel of country experiences, Levine (2000) finds that bank concen-
tration is not strongly associated with negative outcomes in terms of
financial development, industrial competition, or banking fragility.
On the subject of bank-client relationships and concentration,
Petersen and Rajan (1994) study the effects of lender-small-business
relationships on interest rates and loan availability (the latter proxied
by the percentage of a firm’s trade credits paid late). They find a
positive association between the number of banks that lend to a firm
and the interest rate charged for the latest loan, but no significant
connection between this rate and the length of the firm-lender rela-
tionship. They also find a negative effect of the length of the longest
relationship and the firm’s age on loan availability, although this lat-
ter variable is positively related to the number of banks from which
the firm borrows. Berger and Udell (1995) analyze the role of lender-
borrower relationships on the loan rate spreads (over the lending
bank’s premium rate) paid by small firms. They find a negative corre-
lation between the length of the firm’s relationship and these spreads.
Blackwell and Winters (1997) find a positive correlation between the
bank’s monitoring effort and the loan’s interest rate and that banks
monitor firms with which they have closer ties less often. Cole (1998)
studies the effect of preexisting relationships between firms and lend-
ers on loan availability and finds a positive association. He does not
find any role for relationship length.
Chakravarty and Scott (1999) empirically study the effects of rela-
tionships in the market for consumer loans using a dataset that al-
lows them to identify credit-constrained individuals. They find that
the following characteristics significantly lower the likelihood of be-
ing liquidity constrained: the length of the relationship between a
household and a potential lender; the number of activities a customer
has with his or her bank (proxied by the number of accounts); and the
number of financial institutions with which a household has relation-
ships. Furthermore, they find that the rates charged on collateral-
ized loans are less sensitive to these relationship variables than the
rates on uncollateralized loans.
All these papers use data from the U.S. economy, from which
lessons are not directly applicable to an emerging market economy
like Chile. In a closely related paper and using Chilean manufactur-
ing data, Repetto, Rodríguez, and Valdés (2002) find that lower con-
centration, measured by the number of banks from which a firmConcentration, Hold-up, and Information Revelation 217
borrows, is associated with lower costs of loans. They also find that
the length of lender-borrower relationships has a negative effect on
interest rates paid. These findings are at odds with the results of
Petersen and Rajan (1994), based on U.S. firm data. In comparison
with the United States, Chilean firms and the financial market struc-
ture are both considerably different. Among other things, bankruptcy
procedures are not alike, firm size differs substantially, the number
of banks is much smaller in Chile, and the Chilean market is highly
collateralized.
2. DATA
The data in this study come from two sources. The first dataset
covers information on all credit transactions between commercial
banks and firms. The information is collected by the Superintendence
of Banks and Financial Institutions (SBIF), Chile’s commercial bank
regulatory and supervision agency. The dataset contains information
on the amount borrowed by each firm from each commercial bank,
the fraction of outstanding and past-due loans, (cartera vencida, in-
cluding data on credits paid late, or mora), and the credit risk rating
of the loan assigned by each lending bank. In Chile, all individuals
and firms are assigned a unique identification or taxpayer code when
they are born or legally incorporated, known as the Rol Unico
Tributario or RUT. This code is recorded in the dataset and allows us
to follow firms over time.3
This dataset has been matched with the second source we use, the
Annual National Industrial Survey or ENIA, a survey of manufactur-
ing firms conducted annually by the government statistics agency (Na-
tional Statistics Institute, INE). The ENIA covers all manufacturing
plants that employ at least ten individuals. It thus includes all newly
created and continuing plants with ten or more employees, and it
excludes plants that ceased activities or reduced their hiring below
the survey’s threshold. The ENIA covers about 50 percent of total
manufacturing employment.4 It collects detailed information on plant
characteristics, such as manufacturing subsector (at the four-digit level
3. SBIF and Central Bank statisticians deleted the RUTs from our sample to
protect the firms’ identity. However, they randomly assigned firms a new identi-
fication code that allows us to follow them over time.
4. Industrial employment accounts for roughly 16 percent of total Chilean
employment.218 A. García, A. Repetto, S. Rodríguez, and R. Valdés
of the International Standard Industrial Classification, or ISIC), own-
ership status, sales, employment, location, and investment. Although
not reported in the publicly available dataset, the survey records the
firms’ RUT, so the two datasets can be matched.5
Matching firms across surveys induces a series of measurement
problems. The most important is that the SBIF data gathers informa-
tion on all the firm’s activities, whereas the ENIA only records manu-
facturing-related activities. Thus, if a firm produces manufacturing
and nonmanufacturing goods and services under the same RUT, the
SBIF data will represent a broader set of activities than will the ENIA.
This means that we may overestimate the debt. Furthermore, the
ENIA registers information at the plant level, not at the firm level.
Still, we were able to add up information on plants belonging to the
same firm as long as they produce under the same RUT.
After we exclude firms with no debt, our dataset contains almost
13,000 observations on 2,063 firms over the 1990–98 period. Nominal
figures were deflated using the value-added and gross production de-
flators constructed by ECLAC at the three-digit ISIC level (see Yagui,
1993). These adjustments take into account that stock variables are
recorded at year-end prices, whereas the prices of flow variables rep-
resent within-year averages.
Table 1 reports basic statistics on sales, employment, physical
capital stock, and profits, by industrial sector.6 The average firm hires
149 employees, sells just over 4.6 billion pesos (US$11.2 million), holds
a capital stock of almost 2.9 billion pesos (US$7.0 million), and earns
profits of 1.4 billion pesos (US$3.4 million).7 The largest firms belong
to ISIC sectors 372 (nonferrous metals), 314 (tobacco), 353 (petro-
leum refining), 371 (steel products), and 341 (pulp and paper). The
smallest firms belong to sectors 385 (scientific and professional equip-
ment), 390 (other manufacturing products), 354 (oil and coal prod-
ucts), 323 (leather products), and 331 (wood products, except furniture).
5. The surveys were matched by Central Bank and SBIF statisticians, who
assigned our new identification codes to the firms.
6. Capital is reported (at book value) only since 1996. We constructed the
series using the information on investment and the capital accumulation equa-
tion, Kt = (1 – δ )Kt–1 + It–1. We used the depreciation rates in Liu (1993) and the
investment deflators in Bergoeing, Hernando, and Repetto (2002). This procedure
forces us to drop a large number of observations in regression models that include
the capital stock, because capital cannot be estimated for firms that were in the
sample only in years prior to 1996. Capital stock includes machinery, vehicles,
buildings, furniture, and other forms of capital, but excludes land.
7. Dollar amounts are calculated at the average 1996 exchange rate.Concentration, Hold-up, and Information Revelation 219
Table 2 describes the borrowing patterns of the sample firms.
The first three columns report total debt for all firms, as well as by
firm size. Firm size categories are based on employment quintiles, so
the second entry represents the level of debt of the smallest 20 per-
cent of firms. The average firm owes over 1.1 billion pesos (over 80
million pesos at the median). The average ratio of debt to capital
stock is 2.14, and the median is 0.48. Although the amount borrowed
increases with firm size, the ratio of debt to capital stock does not:
the smallest and the largest firms have the highest average ratios.
One possible explanation for this pattern is that smaller firms have a
higher demand for funds, and small firms that manage to obtain loans
get large amounts relative to their capital stocks. At the other end of
the distribution, larger firms are offered more loans, and they bor-
row more from banks despite their ability to raise funds from differ-
ent sources. An alternative explanation is that our matching procedure
induces mismeasurement of the debt-capital ratios and that these
errors are larger for smaller firms. The median ratio of debt to capi-
tal is hump-shaped. This median should be more robust to our mea-
surement problems.
The table also reports our measures of firm closeness to its credi-
tors. Columns seven and eight report the number of banks that lend to
each firm in the sample.8 On average, sample firms have a lending
relationship with about 2.9 banks. At the median, firms borrow from
2.0 banks. The number of related banks strongly increases with firm
size. The smallest 20 percent of firms have, on average, slightly less
than two lenders (one lender at the median), whereas the largest 20
percent of firms borrow on average from over 5.1 banks (4.0 at the
median).
A second measure of closeness to a bank is credit concentration.
The firm-specific Herfindahl index we report was calculated using
the shares of total debt borrowed from each of the banks that actually
lend to the firm. This measure also shows that bank lending is highly
concentrated, and that concentration decreases as firm size increases.
Our final measure of firm-bank closeness is the duration of the
relationship. Table 3 presents four alternative measures of our loan
tenure variable. Each measure is designed to capture different as-
sumptions about the information on borrowers that banks share.
8. In 1990, there were forty-one banks in business in Chile. In 1999, there
were twenty-nine banks. The number of banks declined steadily over the sample



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5Concentration, Hold-up, and Information Revelation 223
The first two columns of the table show the number of years the firm
has been borrowing from the banking system starting in 1989.
On average, firms have been servicing loans for at least 5.3 years (or
5.0 years at the median). The second measure takes the age of the
newest loan currently being served as a proxy of the strength of the
relationship, whereas the other two proxies take the age of the oldest
outstanding loan and the weighted average of the loans’ ages, using
debt size as weights.9 Clearly, all these variables are a censored mea-
sure of the actual age of the loans anytime a firm was already bor-
rowing in 1989. However, if the firm was either created or got its
first loan later on in our sample period, then the relationship’s length
is properly measured. Except for the newest loan, there is an increas-
ing relationship between the measures of firm-bank ties and the size
of the firm at the mean. This is consistent with the notion that smaller
firms tend to be younger and with the fact that censoring of the dura-
tion variable might have a larger effect on big firms.
The distribution of debt-capital ratios is highly skewed. Figure 1
and table 4 present these distributions.10 Not only are the means and
medians quite different, but also the distribution contains extremely
With system Current min Current max Weighted average
Category of firms Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
All firms






















































Table 3. Relationship Length
Source: SBIF data set and ENIA.
9. These measures are highly correlated. The lowest correlation coefficient is
equal to 0.48 (between the age of the newest loan and the age of the relationship
with the system), and the highest is 0.9 (between the age of the oldest loan and of
the relationship with the system).
10. For illustration purposes only, the distribution was truncated at the top in
figure 1.224 A. García, A. Repetto, S. Rodríguez, and R. Valdés
high and low values. Possibly, a number of these extreme observa-
tions are due to our matching procedure. Since the median, unlike
the mean, is less affected by these extreme observations, the regres-
sion analysis below is based on least absolute deviations (LAD) meth-
































Table 4. Distribution of Debt-Capital Ratios
Figure 1. Density of Debt-Capital Ratios
Source: SBIF data set and ENIA.
11. See Amemiya (1985) for a derivation of the estimator and a proof of its
consistency. See the appendix for a description of the method.Concentration, Hold-up, and Information Revelation 225
3. RELATIONSHIPS, CONCENTRATION, AND FIRM
BORROWING PATTERNS
As mentioned in section 2, the closeness of firm-bank relation-
ships theoretically has an ambiguous effect on the availability of funds.
First, lengthy relationships allow banks to learn more about the firm,
its projects and its managers, thereby alleviating information asym-
metries. However, if (positive) information on a firm cannot be easily
conveyed to the rest of the banking system, then lengthy relation-
ships may lead to information monopolies: if a firm requests a loan
from a nonconnected bank, it may signal that the related bank is not
willing to lend. This hold-up problem is more relevant for firms with
closer ties. Key for interpreting our findings below is the fact that
banks do not share all the information they gather on borrowers as
they lend. Commercial banks in Chile have access to information on
the total amount borrowed by each firm (with respect to the complete
banking system) and whether firms have loans overdue. They know
the total amount that is overdue and the lending institutions involved,
although not the exact distribution among creditors. The SBIF pro-
vides this information to each bank on a monthly basis.
Concentration measures also have an ambiguous effect on lend-
ing volume. On the one hand, bank concentration may be cost effi-
cient. On the other, concentration can lead to monopoly pricing and
to information monopolies. In this and the next section, we empiri-
cally estimate the effects of the length of firm-bank relationships on
the availability of funds.
3.1 Benchmark Estimates
Our benchmark econometric model includes three sets of vari-
ables. The first includes variables that capture the effects of firm-
bank relationships on lending: the age of the oldest loan, the
firm-specific Herfindahl index, and the number of lending banks. The
second set is designed to control for firm characteristics, such as size
(measured by the natural log of sales and the number of employee),
profitability (measured by the ratio of current profits over sales), and
quality (measured by firm age and an indicator of credit history). Fi-
nally, we add time dummies to control for aggregate shocks that226 A. García, A. Repetto, S. Rodríguez, and R. Valdés
affect all firms, sectoral dummies at the three-digit ISIC level, and
regional dummies to account for differences across locations.12
The length of the relationship and the age of the firm are corre-
lated. Older firms have been producing for a longer time. If a firm’s
age is a proxy for firm quality, then older firms are more likely to be
able to borrow. Furthermore, a selection bias owing to exit can lead
to a positive effect of age on the amount borrowed. To distinguish the
age effect from the relationship duration effect, we add controls for
the age of the firm. We do not directly observe the date in which the
firm was created, but RUTs are assigned chronologically by the In-
ternal Revenue Service; that is, a younger firm has a larger RUT
number than an older firm. These identification numbers are assigned
within ownership categories. For instance, individuals are given RUT
numbers ranging between 0 and 48 million, limited liability corpora-
tions have RUT numbers between 77 million and 80 million, and pub-
licly listed companies have RUTs between 90 million and 97 million.
Since we are not allowed to directly observe the RUTs, Central Bank
statisticians created a variable we label rank RUT. This variable is
an ordering from larger to smaller RUT (so the lowest number is
assigned to the youngest firm) within ownership categories. There
are eleven categories in our dataset, although over 90 percent of the
sample is made up of individuals, limited-liability corporations and
publicly traded companies.
The first four columns of table 5 present our benchmark specifica-
tion using alternative measures of relationship length. The first col-
umn uses the number of years the firm has been borrowing from the
banking sector, while the next three columns use the age of the new-
est outstanding loan, the age of the oldest outstanding loan, and the
weighted average of the age of current loans, respectively. Our rela-
tionship measures have a positive and significant effect on debt-to-
capital ratios in all specifications, that is, firms that have been
borrowing for a long period are capable of funding a larger fraction of
their capital stock through the banking system. The size of the effect is
quite similar across specifications, varying between 0.0103 and 0.0138.
These magnitudes are large, as they represent about 2.1 percent to 2.9
percent of the median debt-capital ratio in the sample. Because the
regressions already control for the age of the firm, this effect should
capture the role of ties between firms and banks. The effect might be
overestimated, however, as our duration measures are right-censored.
12. Chile is divided into thirteen administrative regions.Concentration, Hold-up, and Information Revelation 227
Concentration, as measured by the firm-specific Herfindahl in-
dex, has a large and negative effect on the amount borrowed. The
number of banks from which firms borrow also has a positive and
large effect on loans. The table also shows the estimated effect of
increasing the number of banks from which a firm borrows from one
to two (assuming equal bank shares) and from two to three. Moving
from one to two relationships allows firms to increase their debt-to-
capital ratios by about 35 percentage points; moving from two to three
banks leads to an increase of about 20 percentage points. Figure 2
plots the estimated effect of increasing the number of relationships
(with +/– 2 standard errors), assuming that debt is split equally among
banks.13 The magnitude is always large and significant. As the num-
ber of ties increases, the effect of the Herfindahl index tends to disap-
pear, and the total effect converges to the coefficient of the number
of related banks.14
To allow for a more flexible specification of the effect of concen-
tration on firm borrowing, columns 5 through 8 replace the Herfindahl
and the number of banks with a set of dummies that accounts for the
number of banks to which the firms is related. All the coefficients
turn out to be negative and significant. The estimated effect is de-
creasing—in absolute terms—in the number of banks; that is, firms
13. Figure 1 is based on the results reported in column 1.
14. Assuming equal bank shares, the Herfindahl index is equal to 1/n, where
n is the number of relationships. Thus the limit of this index as n tends to infinity
is 0.
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with fewer relationships borrow less than firms with more relation-
ships. The bottom panel of the table reestimates the effect of an ex-
tra relationship using these specifications. The effect of moving from
a single relationship to two is quite similar to the effect of moving
from two to three. The effect (about 25 percentage points) is, on aver-
age, very close to the effect estimated in the previous set of regres-
sions, so the combined effect of our concentration variables turns out
to be robust to alternative functional specifications. The use of the
number of relationship dummies does not alter the other regression
results materially.
As to the control variables, both firm size variables show that
larger firms have lower debt-to-capital ratios. This result may seem
counterintuitive, but larger firms have better access to other forms
of financing. As firms grow, they probably become increasingly de-
pendent on arm’s length financing, rather than on the banking sys-
tem.15 The estimation results indicate that if a firm hires 100 more
employees (about a third of the standard deviation of employment in
the sample), then the debt-capital ratio falls by 4 percentage points.
Moreover, a 1 percent increase in the value of sales reduces the ratio
by 0.3 percentage points.
The effect of profits is also counterintuitive: as firms become more
profitable, they finance a larger fraction of their capital stock through
bank loans. These regressions are reduced-form regressions, how-
ever, so profitable firms may have better access to funds even though
they are in less need of them. If a bank can spot this profitability, it
will probably be more interested in lending. According to our regres-
sion results, if sales as a fraction of profits increase by one percent-
age point, the debt-capital ratio increase by 0.05 percentage points.
A lengthier relationship alleviates the information asymmetries
between banks and firms. However, firms are only able to get more
loans as long as the revealed information is good. The next regres-
sion includes a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm had an overdue
loan in the past (during our sample period).16 We find that negative
information on past loans has a negative impact on the availability of
15. This is precisely what Houston and James (1996) find.
16. According to Chilean bank regulation, a loan is classified as past due when
an installment of either principal or interest is overdue by 90 days or more. Banks
can start legal collection procedures when installment of principal or interest is
overdue. They can begin the collection process before 90 days if there is a pre-
sumption of a significant deterioration in debtor’s quality.Concentration, Hold-up, and Information Revelation 231
current funds. If a firm was delinquent in the past, it can today finance
about 3.4 percentage points less of its capital stock with banking debt.
Finally, our age controls show that older firms finance a smaller
share of their capital stock with debt. The effect is significant for
individuals and limited liability corporations, but not for publicly traded
companies. Within our sample period, twenty-three new individually
owned plants, forty-four new limited liability companies, and forty-
six new publicly traded companies appear in our dataset.17 According
to the regression estimates, the newest individually owned firm has
a debt-capital ratio that is 0.14 percentage points larger than the last
firm of this ownership type created in 1990, whereas the newest lim-
ited liability firm’s ratio is 0.18 percentage points higher. Although
the effect on publicly owned companies is not significant in most speci-
fications, the point estimate indicates that the newest firm of this
type in the sample has a ratio of almost 0.05 percentage points larger.
In sum, our measures of the closeness of firm-bank relationships
have a large impact on the availability of funds. Relationships do
matter, and they have a beneficial effect on firms. This result is con-
sistent with the hypothesis that not all information is public and eas-
ily verifiable and that close ties between firms and lenders do alleviate
informational asymmetries. Furthermore, our results indicate that
borrowing concentration makes firms worse off. Economically, the
greatest effect occurs when the number of ties is relatively small. In
the next subsection, we extend the analysis to alternative assump-
tions on the statistical behavior of the concentration variables.
3.2 Endogeneity of Concentration Measures
An alternative interpretation of the role of concentration is that the
amount borrowed and the number of lending banks are mechanically
related: more debt should naturally be supplied by more banks. This
is consistent with the large t statistics of the estimated coefficients
(see table 5). This need not be the case, however. When they wish to
borrow more, firms may choose not to relate to more banks, as there
are fixed costs in establishing ties. And even if this is the case, the
linear term should capture this effect, and the large effect measured
by the Herfindahl index would still be relevant. Alternatively, one
17. These new firms do not necessarily represent start ups. Some of these
firms may have increased their hiring over the ENIA sampling threshold or may
have borrowed from the banking system for the first time. Most firms in our
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could argue that there are legal limits on how much a bank can lend
to a single firm. These limits, however, are most likely nonbinding
for most of our firms. Finally, if loans are collateralized, firms need
to have divisible guarantees in order to borrow from different banks.
To control for these potential problems, we reestimated our re-
gression model through a two step procedure. In the first stage we
obtain the ordinary least squares prediction from the regression of
the problematic variables (the number of related banks and the
Herfindahl index) on the other exogenous variables and a number of
instruments. In the second stage we estimate the parameters of the
model by a least absolute deviation regression of debt-capital ratios
on the projected and exogenous variables.18
We use two types of instruments: the number of banks in the
locality (provincia) and a set of dummies indicating bank mergers.19
These dummies are equal to one if the firm was borrowing from two
banks that merged in that given year, and zero otherwise.20 We be-
lieve that these variables are correlated with the number of banks
with which a firm can establish a relationship and with interbank
competition (and thus with the lending concentration faced by bor-
rowers). Furthermore, we treat these variables as truly exogenous
to individual firms.
Table 6 presents the estimated results. The first column uses the
five merger dummies only, whereas the second column uses the com-
plete list of instruments.21 Both specifications show that the age of
the relationship has a positive effect on firm borrowing. However,
neither shows a significant effect. Although the sign of the Herfindahl
index is reversed, this time we cannot reject the null that the effect
of this concentration variable is zero. Even so, the effect of the num-
ber of related banks is positive and significant, indicating that the
establishment of a new relationship increases the availability of funds
18. This procedure is a modified version of two-stage least squares (2SLS),
with a LAD regression (instead of OLS) in the second stage. We provide a descrip-
tion of the general LAD estimation methodology, and of our modified version of it,
in the appendix.
19. There are fifty-one provincias in Chile.
20. The following are the relevant mergers within our sample period: (1)
O’Higgins and Centro Hispano in 1993, (2) O’Higgins and Bank of Hong Kong in
1993, (3) BHIF and Banesto in 1995, (4) Osorno and Santander in 1996, and (5)
O’Higgins and Santiago in 1997.
21. The table reports the results using the age of the newest outstanding loan.
The LAD procedures using the alternative relationship-length variables did not
converge. We believe that these alternative specifications should lead to similar
results, given the high correlation among these definitions and the results in table 5.Concentration, Hold-up, and Information Revelation 233
to firms. We find that an extra relationship increases the debt-capital
ratio of the firm by about 20 percentage points. This effect is much
larger than the one presented in table 5. The table also repeats our
earlier exercise in which we estimated the effect of increasing the
number of banks from which a firm borrows, first from one to two
and then from two to three. The effect of a second bank is statisti-
cally not different from zero, perhaps because the Herfindahl index is
not significant. As the number of banks increases, the effect approaches
the coefficient of the number of relationship variables, and it becomes
large and significant.
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a. The dependent variable is the debt-to-capital ratio; t statistics in parentheses.
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The estimated effect of the other control variables is not materi-
ally affected, with a slightly larger effect of the payment history of
the firm and of the size measures.
Summing up, we have again found that bank lending concentra-
tion is harmful for firms in terms of funds availability. This result is
consistent with the hypothesis that concentration leads to monopoly
pricing and information monopolies. We do not find that lengthy rela-
tionships allow firms to borrow more, however.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
We have examined the effects of concentration and the length of
bank-lender relationships on the volume of bank lending using a
sample of Chilean manufacturing firms. After controlling for size,
economic sector, (relative) firm age, location, profitability, and credit
history, we find that concentration appears to be very important for
the volume of bank lending. The results show that the debt-to-capital
ratio rises significantly as concentration falls and that this effect is
considerably larger when the number of bank-firm relationships is
small. For instance, when we control for the linear effect of the num-
ber of banks to which a firm is related, increasing the number of
relationships from one to two raises the median debt-to-capital ratio
from 0.48 to about 0.82, whereas increasing the number of relation-
ships from two to three raises the median debt-to-capital ratio from
0.48 to about 0.68. The length of borrower-lender relationships (mea-
sured by the age of the oldest relationship with the banking system)
has a positive, though not always significant, effect on the volume of
loans. One extra year of relationship increases the debt-to-capital ratio
by 2.1 percent to 2.9 percent.
These results motivate two policy implications. First, they show
that, on average, a lengthier relationship is convenient for firms.
Policymakers, therefore, should not worry if firms persistently choose
to do business with the same banks. Second, the evidence is consis-
tent with the idea that enhancing the number of relationships that a
particular firm has can increase the volume of credit.
The latter implication has important practical consequences. To
begin with, tax policy should avoid lock-in effects that make it difficult
for firms to shop around. More significantly, policy should foster mul-
tiple relationships. The chief difficulty a typical firm faces with regard
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guarantees. Moving guarantees across banks is a difficult task in
Chile. Some people have proposed centralizing the administration of
guarantees to facilitate bank shifts. The evidence of this paper shows
that this might not be enough. True competition needs firms to re-
late contemporaneously to more than one bank, and for that purpose
firms need divisible collateral. The proposed central agency could
provide that service.236 A. García, A. Repetto, S. Rodríguez, and R. Valdés
APPENDIX
Estimation Methods
The least absolute deviations (LAD) estimator computes the me-
dian of a variable conditional on a number of controls. This method
yields results that are more robust than an OLS estimator when er-
rors are heavier tailed than the normal distribution; that is, it is a
more robust procedure under the presence of large outliers. This
appendix briefly describes the method and its properties. The inter-
ested reader may consult the references provided below for a detailed
analysis.
Assume the linear model
 .
If the error terms, ε i, have a zero median conditional on the con-
trols, xi, then the true regression coefficient β 0 can be identified by
Given an independent and identically distributed sample of size
n, β 0 can be estimated using its sample analog,
The consistency proof of the LAD estimator requires the follow-
ing assumptions: the data,
are independent and identically distributed across i; the regressors
have bounded second moments; the error terms are continuously
distributed given xi, with conditional density f(ε /xi) satisfying
i i i x y ε + β ′ = 0
() . arg 0 i i i x y E min ε − β ′ − = β
β
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the density of the error terms is positive and finite at zero; and the
expectation of        is a positive definite matrix.
Under these conditions, it can be proved that the LAD estimator
is consistent, using standard asymptotic arguments for extremum
estimators. See Amemiya (1985) for a detailed proof. Note that the
assumptions do note require that the moments of either yi or ε i exist.
This property makes LAD estimator attractive for heavy-tailed error
distributions.
The proof of asymptotic normality of the LAD estimator is fur-
ther complicated by the fact that the criterion function S(β ) is not
continuously differentiable in β , so the usual Taylor expansions used
to show                        consistency are not applicable. Stochastic equicontinuity
conditions are used to prove asymptotic normality. See Newey and
McFadden (1994) for discussion and a proof.
Given the potential endogeneity of our concentration measures,
the assumption of a conditional zero median of the error term may
not hold. Hence, we also replace our concentration measures in the
LAD procedure for measures that are truly exogenous. To construct
such measures, we follow the standard two-stage least squares (2SLS)
approach and run regressions for the concentration measures on all
exogenous variables of the model and a number of instruments. We
then replace the actual concentration variables with their predicted
counterparts in the LAD procedure.
i ix x ′238 A. García, A. Repetto, S. Rodríguez, and R. Valdés
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